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Abstract: 
Guilds made an important contribution to the provision of mutual welfare to their 
members in the Netherlands and some other parts of Europe, giving their 
members entitlements to support and assistance during periods of unemployment, 
sickness or disability. This paper explores the role guilds played in mutual 
insurance in early modern England. A study of the rules and practices of a range 
of guilds from London and provincial towns indicates that craft guilds in England 
had no visible involvement in providing mutual insurance during the sixteenth to 
the eighteenth centuries. They did, however, provide substantial volumes of 
charity, much of which was directed to members of the guild who fell into poverty. 
Mutual insurance emerged on a large scale in England with the Friendly Societies. 
However, there is no evidence that these Societies had any direct or indirect 
connection to craft guilds, except in seeking to project a form of conceptual kinship 
with a medieval fraternal past.  
 
 
  
                                                          
∗ The first version of this paper was presented at the Third Conference on the Comparative History 
of Insurance Law in Europe: “Guilds”. Augsburg. 8 February 2018. I am grateful to participants, 
and particularly the organizer, Phillip Hellwege, for their comments.    Eilish Gregory contributed 
greatly to the paper through her exemplary research assistance 
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To what extent did Europe’s guilds construct a system of cooperative protection 
that prefaced and propagated mutual insurance in a manner that justifies their 
identification as the authors of an early chapter in the history of insurance?  In 
Germany, Hellwege identifies a distinct – possibly artificial, given the political 
background against which it was composed – German history that emphasises the 
role of guilds in the genesis of insurance.1 The link between guilds and mutual 
insurance has been even more strongly stated in the Dutch context. Marcel van 
der Linden identifies guilds as one of the six possible sources for establishing 
autonomous working-class insurance, suggesting that the perpetuation of ‘an older 
tradition’ occurred ‘in countries where journeymen associations and guilds had 
existed if segments of the working class could still remember them, or if traces of 
these associations remained’.2 Van Leeuwen’s study of Dutch guilds shows 
convincingly that many larger guilds offered insurance schemes covering burial, 
sickness, old age or widowhood.3 Similar funds existed in the Southern 
Netherlands.4 These observations for Germany and the Low Countries raise the 
question of the extent to which this form of provision was a common, even 
universal, role for guilds? Indeed, could insurance be a beneficial consequence of 
guilds that might serve as a positive counterweight in the scales of historical 
opinion, offsetting some of the various negative effects (rent seeking etc) that they 
are often identified with?   
 
In this chapter, I examine the question of whether early modern English guilds 
served to structure mutual protection for their members in case of disaster, 
unemployment or illness.  And if so, did they have any connection to developments 
                                                          
1 Phillip Hellwege, A Comparative History of Insurance Law in Europe, American Journal of Legal 
History, 56 (2016), 66–75 (67-68). 
2 Marcel van der Linden, Introduction, in: Marcel van der Linden (ed.), Social Security Mutualism: 
the comparative history of mutual benefit societies (1996), 11-38 (quote 17). 
3 Marco Van Leeuwen, Guilds and middle-class welfare 1550-1800: provisions for burial, sickness, 
old age, and widowhood, Economic History Review 65 (2012), 61-90; Marco Van Leeuwen, Mutual 
Insurance 1550-2015. From Guild Welfare and Friendly Societies to Contemporary Micro-Insurers 
(2016); Sandra Bos, A tradition of giving and receiving: mutual aid within the guild system, in 
Maarten Prak, et al. (eds.), Craft guilds in the early modern Low Countries. Work, power, and 
representation (2006), 174-93. 
4 Karel-Peter Companje, R. Hendriks, Karel Veraghtert and Brigitte Widdershoven, Two centuries 
of solidarity: German, Belgian and Dutch Social Health Care Insurance, 1770-2008 (Amsterdam, 
2009), 33-35 
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in mutual insurance from the later seventeenth century onwards, particularly the 
emergence of mutual protection through the Friendly Societies? The form that 
craft and trade guilds took in England is well known and shares much with 
equivalent corporate organisations elsewhere in Europe. England’s guilds were 
largely urban organisations that exerted control over various occupations, limiting 
full economic participation in specific sectors to their members, regulating product 
quality and market access,  raising funds for city and crown, resolving disputes, 
registering apprenticeships and forming a social, convivial and spiritual thread in 
the lives of (at least some of) their members.5 As geographically limited, medium 
sized and occupationally-focused groups, with a strong pre-existing institutional, 
fraternal and social collective identity, most guilds possessed a set of 
characteristics that would have allowed them to overcome some of the problems of 
information asymmetry, adverse selection and fraud that can beset mutual 
insurance schemes.6  
 
Where the historical literature on corporatism has identified commonalities across 
Europe, the body of work on the development of insurance offers a more divided 
origin narrative.7 English histories of insurance see maritime insurance, securely 
established in the sixteenth century, as the common root of later insurance: from 
this fire and life insurance grew, intermittently at first and then with vigour from 
the late seventeenth century. This narrative, chronological as much as it is 
analytical in form, is maintained across the literature, with ‘rakish, speculative’ 
entrepreneurs, in Trebilcock’s words, and chartered companies, not guilds, 
providing the drive for a series of expansions in the nature and scale of provision 
                                                          
5 Patrick Wallis & Ian Gadd, ‘The Politics of Regulation: from local to national guilds in England, 
1500-1700’, in Stephan R. Epstein and Maarten Prak (eds.), Guilds, Innovation  and the Economy 
in Europe 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 2008); Jan Lucassen, Tine De Moor and Jan Luiten van Zanden, 
The Return of the Guilds: Towards a Global History of the Guilds in Pre-industrial Times, 
International Review of Social History, 53 (2008), supplement, 5-18.  
6 Van Leeuwen, Guilds, 62; Humphrey Southall, Ni l'État, ni le Marché. Les premières prestations 
sociales en Grande-Bretagne, Geneses: sciences sociales et histoire, 18 ( 1995) 22-23. Not all 
English guilds were occupationally homogenous in practice, but many did contain a core 
membership centred on a single main trade. 
7 Phillip Hellwege, Germany, in:  #### 2-29. 
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of insurance.8 English forms of fire insurance ‘contrasted sharply’ with state, 
mutual or cooperative approaches common on the continent, Pearson suggests.9 
Even more extremely, life insurance, the focus of speculative ferment in England, 
had been outlawed almost everywhere else in Europe.10 
 
In order to examine the role English guilds played in insurance, this chapter 
focuses on early modern craft and trade guilds between the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The choice of period reflects both the survival of records and 
the need to explore the crucial centuries in which we would expect guild insurance 
to be most important if it was to serve as a foundation stone for the forms of mutual 
insurance that became commonplace by the late eighteenth century. By looking 
across also three centuries, we can also be reassured that our view of English 
guilds’ activities is not being clouded by the effects of their decline, itself a much 
debated concept that seems best applied (though still only partially accurate) to 
the eighteenth century.11 The identification of guilds’ insurance functions is two-
fold. On the one hand, I seek to identify what if any formal requirements related 
to mutual insurance were written into guilds’ governing statutes and ordinances. 
On the other, I examine guild practice at several points over the sixteenth to 
eighteenth centuries in order to assess what if any forms of insurance they 
provided in reality. 
 
This approach is demanding in empirical terms. Fortunately, sources are 
abundant for guilds in London and exist in reasonable volumes for guilds in other 
cities. The survival of records is, we should note, a product of the institutional 
                                                          
8 H. A.  L. Cockerell & Edwin Green, The British Insurance Business: A guide to its history and 
records, 2nd edn. (1994); Clive Trebilcock, Phoenix Assurance and the Development of British 
Insurance (1985), 2-7,  
30-36; Robin Pearson, Insuring the Industrial Revolution (2004), 15-21; Geoffrey Clark, Betting on 
Lives: the culture of life insurance in England, 1695-1775 (1999), 1-2, 72-105; Christopher 
Kingston, Marine insurance in Britain and America 1720-1844: A comparative institutional 
analysis, Journal of Economic History, 67 (2007), 379-409 (383-7). 
9 Pearson, Insuring, 4. 
10 Clark, Betting on Lives, 8, 13-16. 
11 Michael Berlin, Guilds in Decline? London Livery Companies and the Rise of a Liberal Economy, 
1600–1800, in: Stephan R. Epstein and Maarten Prak (eds.), Guilds, Innovation  and the Economy 
in Europe 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 2008), 316-342; Ian Gadd and Patrick Wallis, Introduction, in: 
Ian Gadd and Patrick Wallis (eds.), Guilds, society & economy in London 1450-1800 (2002), 1-15. 
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independence of guilds. It was those guilds that were chartered directly by the 
crown, and which have often survived into the present in some form, that possess 
the richest material. Most of these are found in the capital, which was 
disproportionately large in early modern England, whether judged on 
demographic, political or economic terms, compared to the primate cities of most 
European states. However, the great majority of English guilds, particularly those 
outside London, were established under the authority and supervision of the local 
borough government of the city in which they were based. They had no right to 
hold property, their existence was less durable, and their records survive less 
frequently, as a result. This does, however, perhaps point to a potential bias if the 
degree of formal recognition correlated with guilds’ engagement in mutual 
provision. 
 
Thus, we need to treat our findings with caution. Our best evidence is from the 
best resourced organisations. They possessed funding that may have allowed them 
to act in ways that not all guilds could. Certainly their feasts and buildings reflect 
a wealth and self-regard that was far beyond the dreams of an everyday provincial 
craft guild. Moreover, we should recognize a second, related issue. London guilds’ 
independent chartered existence meant that they were attractive destinations for 
individuals seeking to establish philanthropic initiatives. As trustees and 
managers of charitable resources, guilds had an additional element to their 
activities that came to dominate their activities in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. We need to be careful therefore to distinguish between their work 
distributing charitable funds that were supplied by others and any mutual 
insurance that they provided. Here, as is obvious, we regard mutual insurance as 
being by definition funded collectively, although we do not wish to define 
restrictively the mechanism by which funds were raised. 
 
The second question of the link between guild behaviour and mutual insurance is 
harder to pin down. In the English context, it forces us to consider a set of 
relatively poorly understood organisations for mutual support that emerged in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The prime case for a guild connection is in 
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the form of journeymen’s box clubs. But mutual societies also had other roots as 
we will see. The nature of the relationship needs also to be specified: is it sufficient 
that guilds and insurance systems shared some common effects, such as 
alleviating need? Or should we expect a more precise connection, such as a 
common mechanism through which such effects could be achieved? I will argue for 
the latter in this chapter. 
 
 
A. Guilds and Mutual Insurance 
It is important to begin any discussion of English guilds and mutual insurance by 
making explicit a fundamental distinction between charity and insurance that 
easily lost in the search for institutional ancestry. Many guilds engaged in 
charitable works. Often some of the beneficiaries were their own members. 
Charity was also a central element of the mixed economy of welfare.12 However, 
guild members had no right to demand access to charity. The guild’s officials who 
distributed it would have accepted no firm constraint – whether based on the 
length of membership or the maintenance of contributions to any collective funds 
- on their judgement of who should be a recipient. Longevity and participation did 
surely matter in guild decision making over pensions and relief, but it was one 
element of an compelling argument for assistance, not the root of an individual’s 
rights.  
 
Insurance, I would suggest, implies a clear quid pro quo. It is only discretionary 
to the extent that the insurer is able to question whether a claimant meets a set 
of mutually recognised terms under which disbursements should be made. 
Contributions are tied to the accumulation of rights. And benefits are pre-defined, 
either relatively or absolutely, and depersonalised. 
 
                                                          
12  This distinction is obviously not relevant to estimates of the overall scale of relief, as in Bas van 
Bavel and  Auke Rijpma, How important were formalized charity and social spending before the 
rise of the welfare state? A long-run analysis of selected Western European cases, 1400-1850, The 
Economic History Review, 69 (2016), 159–187 (161). 
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There was no reason for English guilds not to offer insurance. Many occupational 
organizations have done so, including trade unions. In the eighteenth century, 
Malcolm Chase concluded that ‘”Trade Union” and “Sick Club” represented the 
two ends of an organizational continuity which cannot be easily divided’.13 Fire 
insurance was often organised on a mutual in late seventeenth century London, 
and many of the founders of early firms had ties to the city’s guilds.14  In 1698, the 
London Mercers’ Company, one of the most prominent of London’s guilds, even 
undertook the management of a reversionary annuity scheme designed to assist 
the widows and orphans of clergymen that Clark categorises among the early 
forms of life insurance. This experiment was to end badly, with the guild 
eventually driven into bankruptcy in 1748 by the burden of paying out.15 As 
noteworthy, however, is that the participants in the scheme were largely clergy, 
medical practitioners and legal personnel. This was not an innovation intended 
for the guilds’ own membership.16 The question, then, is the extent to which guild 
membership carried with it rights to some form of insurance, rights that might 
well take the form that was seen in early unions or journeymen’s associations.  
 
Insurance, if it existed, should have left several types of traces: regulations about 
contributions and entitlements; petitions and disputes over rights; financial 
records of capital stocks and payments; and the paperwork from city or state 
responses to crises and collapses of funds. In his study of Dutch guilds, this is the 
material that van Leeuwen was able to examine. From it, he could identify 
participation rates, benefit levels, and mechanisms to deal with moral hazard and 
adverse selection. If English guilds offered mutual insurance, then surely they too 
should possess similar signs among their records. 
 
                                                          
13 Malcolm Chase, Early Trade Unionism (2000), 22. See also: C.R. Dobson, Masters and 
Journeymen: A prehistory of industrial relations (1980), 45-6; John Rule, Experience of Labour in 
eighteenth-century Industry (1981), 150-151, 180-181. 
14 Pearson, Insuring, 62-64; Robin Pearson, Mutuality tested: the rise and fall of mutual fire 
insurance offices in eighteenth century London’, Business History, 44 (2002): 1-28. 
15 Clark, Betting on Lives, 134-144. 
16 Clark, Betting on Lives, 162-4. 
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Simply put, they do not. We can illustrate this absence in two ways. First, by 
exploring the ordinances (rules) that guilds wrote for themselves. Second, by 
looking at their financial and administrative records, to identify what they did in 
practice. 
 
The rules of early modern English guilds survive in relatively large numbers. 
Under English law, guilds had to have their ordinances approved by legal officials. 
For independent guilds that operated under a charter from the Crown, this meant 
having ordinances signed off by the Lord Chancellor, one of the country’s senior 
judges and crown officials. For guilds operating under license of a town or city, 
this required having the local government accept their rules at a meeting of its 
governing body, which usually possessed the power to pass regulations under its 
own charter from the crown. One consequence of this vetting procedure is that 
ordinances survive in guild, city and state archives, and that their safety was an 
important concern for the guild. 
 
In order to assess the degree to which mutual insurance mechanisms were written 
into guild rules I surveyed a cross section of ordinances for London and Provincial 
guilds.  For London, I evaluated 38 sets of ordinances drawn up by 21 guilds (see 
Appendix A). Six sets of rules are from the fifteenth century, ten from the 
sixteenth, sixteen are from the seventeenth, and six from the eighteenth century. 
The guilds range from the largest and wealthiest mercantile bodies, such as the 
Merchant Taylors and Grocers, to smaller craft groupings, such as the Curriers, 
Founders and Horners. They include some of the oldest and most durable, such as 
the Bakers, and some ‘new’ guilds that were formed in the seventeenth century, 
such as the Gold and Silver Wire Drawers and Framework Knitters.  
 
For provincial guilds, I reviewed a smaller sample covering six guilds from four 
towns and cities.17  The locations that this modest survey covers include important 
                                                          
17 Newcastle upon Tyne Coopers’ Guild (1674), Newcastle and Tyne Archives, GU CO/2/2 (1662), 
accessed at https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/imems/Cities/Governing/Governing-
OrdinancesoftheNewcastlecoopers.pdf (accessed 29 November 2017); Shrewsbury Glovers Guild 
(1614), Shropshire Archives, Shrewsbury, SBA, 6001/4275; Shrewsbury Tailors’ Guild (1610), SRS 
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expanding cities, such as Bristol and Newcastle, as well as smaller and more stable 
communities, such as Shrewsbury and Salisbury. Most ordinances survive from 
the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  
 
The main conclusion from this exercise is simple: rules that provide for any 
element of mutual insurance are conspicuous by their absence across these 
samples. English guilds did not create formal systems for the mutual insurance of 
their membership. However, there were two partial exceptions to this rule. These 
show that some form of more organised contribution to relief was not unthinkable. 
 
First, the London Butchers’ Company in 1685 added an ordinance requiring that 
everyone to pay towards the relief and maintenance of the guilds’ ‘poor widows…& 
other poore members fallen to decay’. Members of the livery (the senior members 
of the guild) were to pay 6d every quarter day, while the yeomanry (ordinary 
freemen) were to pay 3d. This is a solitary instance of formalising welfare 
contributions among guild rules. The sums involved were relatively small: to set 
them in context, these contributions were only twice the size of the charges that 
members were required to contribute to the guild’s barge, used in processions on 
the Thames.18 More important is that the rule is closer in nature to the poor law 
than insurance: the Butchers essentially imposed a tax on their members. They 
did not create a fund. They wrote no rules on eligibility or access that gave rights 
to relief to their members. 
 
Second, around seventy years previously, the London Merchant Taylors’ Company 
wrote into their ordinances a rule setting out the process for admission to a place 
among the company’s almsmen. The Company owned almshouses containing a set 
number of rooms which were offered to members who had ‘fallen into Poverty, so 
it bee not through Ryott, wanton or lavish Expences, his owne negligence or other 
                                                          
6001/5837; Shrewsbury Tanners’ Guild (1640), SRS 6001/5837; Salisbury Merchant Guild (1675), 
in: Charles Haskins, Ancient Trade Guilds and Companies of Salisbury (1912), 52-4; Bristol 
Soapmakers (c. 1720), in: Harold Matthews, Proceedings Minutes And Enrolments Of The 
Company Of Soapmakers, Bristol Record Society vol. 10 (1940), 225-40 
18 Guidhall Library [GL], London, MS 06460, (1 Oct 1685). This had disappeared by the 1752 
ordinances (GL MS 06463). 
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misdemeanure’ as they became available. Freemen qualified if they had made his 
full contributions to the charges facing the guild. Alongside a place in the 
almshouse, these company paupers were to receive 26s a quarter, a share of coals 
left under legacies by members, and the cost of their burial – at which the Master 
and Wardens were to appear. Almsmen were to appear at service every week, and 
drunkards, those ‘of unchast life’ and any who married could be displaced.19  
Access to housing, fuel and a pension amounts to a substantial element of support 
for those in need. However, this provision was tightly rationed by the number of 
places in the almshouses. The almshouses were not themselves constructed by the 
guild from its collective resources, but were founded through charitable legacies 
from wealthy members. In short, this rule was created to define the terms of access 
to an important set of philanthropic resources managed by the guild, not to provide 
a mechanism to distribute mutual resources. 
 
These two metropolitan examples illustrate that guilds had the organizational 
capacity and concern for members’ welfare that might have motivated them to 
establish a mutual insurance system. They also possessed the instinct for 
bureaucratic regulation that would have led to such systems being articulated in 
their regulations. In the case of England’s guilds, it strongly suggests that the 
absence of evidence is, at least in the case of mutual insurance, evidence of 
absence.  
 
Still, rules are not reality, as a generation or more of guild historians have 
repeatedly noted. It may be that we are not seeing rules for mutual insurance 
within guild ordinances for a reason. Perhaps guilds operated mutual insurance 
systems in parallel with their legally defined rights and responsibilities. Perhaps 
they deliberately kept the rules for these systems outside their ordinances. It is 
hard to imagine why this should be so, given the importance of regulation in 
maintaining the credibility of mutual schemes. Insurance and mutual provision 
                                                          
19 C. M. Clode, Memorials of the Guild of Merchant Taylors of the Fraternity of St. John the Baptist 
in the City of London (1875), 207-8. See Ann Saunders and Matthew Davies, The History of the 
Merchant Taylors' Company (2004). 
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involves contracts that are necessarily incomplete and contributions and benefits 
that are separated by substantial periods of time. Rules are useful devices in such 
situations. Yet the possibility exists. 
 
To explore whether English guilds were providing mutual insurance in practice, 
even if this was not in their rules, I surveyed the records of a selection of guilds, 
hunting for any traces of mutual insurance. For London, I worked through three-
year long samples of the main governing Court records for the Clothworkers’, the 
Pewterers’, the Carpenters’ and the Apothecaries’ guilds. Wherever possible, I 
reviewed a sequence of periods at intervals a century apart from the sixteenth to 
the eighteenth centuries in order to identify any changes over time. These guilds 
offer a broad range of occupations and political positions. The Clothworkers was 
one of the ‘Great Twelve’ guilds that contained the governors of the city, and 
included both rich merchants and modest artisans in its membership. On the other 
hand the Pewterers, Carpenters and Apothecaries were smaller, less powerful but 
potentially more cohesive organizations with artisanal and middling sort 
members.  For provincial guilds, I examined the records of the Newcastle’s Barber 
Surgeons, 20 Shrewsbury’s Tailors,21 and Bristol’s Soapmakers. These too form a 
deliberately heterogeneous sample of guilds, with a mix of types of work, wealth 
and geography. If guilds were often acting as insurers, we would anticipate 
identifying at least some sign of this in the papers and records of some of these 
seven guilds. 
 
Guild’s records are less simple to use than ordinances. Most survive in the form of 
Minute Books kept by guild clerks during the meetings of its governing body – 
usually styled the ‘Court of Assistants’ – in which significant items of business 
were recorded for posterity. These minute books vary greatly in the level of detail 
they contain. However, they have a strong bias towards including records of events 
                                                          
20 Dennis Embleton, The incorporated company of barber-surgeons and wax and tallow-chandlers 
of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Archaeologia Aeliana, 15 (1892), pp. 228-269; The Ancient Ordinary of 
the Barber-Surgeons of York, A. D., 1486, as revised and augmented A. D., 1592, in Frederick 
Furnivall and P. Furnivall, (eds.) Anatomie of the Bodie of Man (1888), 269-288. 
21 Shrewsbury Weavers’ Records, Shropshire Archives, SBR 6001/3359 (1580-1609), 6001/3360, 1-
15r, 110-119v, 175r-184 (1609-14; 1664-1673; 1725-58). 
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that could affect the future of the guild. For this reason, financial and membership 
matters, such as the admissions of apprentices and freemen, usually dominate, as 
they do in the Financial Records that are the guilds other main series of primary 
sources. Insurance, if it existed, would surely fall into the category of events that 
we would expect to appear on these pages, given that it touched on both these 
categories. Yet there is no sign of insurance or mutual protection within the pages 
of these guilds’ Court Minute Books.  
 
When we turn to guilds’ financial records, we find the same. They list charitable 
disbursements, alms and gifts, but never mention payments made under a mutual 
or insurance system. Perhaps the most compelling evidence of this comes from the 
way in which guild membership dues operated in this period. Guilds collected 
regular payments from their members, usually styled quarterage. These were not 
large sums, often a few pence to be paid every three months. If any aspect of these 
guild’s activities was to be adapted into a de facto mutual insurance scheme it 
would be quarterage, as it offered the revenue stream required to fund benefits. If 
this were to happen, then the incentive for guild members to pay their dues would 
be transformed, with the right to benefits tied to their maintenance of regular 
contributions – a universal requirement among early mutual insurance systems. 
This does not seem to have been the case. In fact, it is clear that in many guilds 
contribution rates to quarterage, the main regular charge that guilds’ expected 
from their members, were often far below their theoretical maximum. For 
example, the Drapers were struggling in the 1640s to collect quarterage, with 
many of the poorer members ceasing to pay, and contributions restricted to those 
who were binding or freeing apprentices –paying up one’s debt to the guild was 
often a condition for an apprentice being registered.22 This kind of behaviour is 
the opposite of the effect we might expect to see if contributions were linked to the 
right to claim benefits of some kind.  
 
                                                          
22 Arthur Johnson, The History of the Worshipful Company of the Drapers of London, vol. 3 (1914), 
194-5. 
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The negative findings of our search for signs of mutual protection in the business 
records of English guilds echo the absence of rules for its provision from their 
ordinances. England’s craft guilds seem not to have provided mechanisms for 
mutual insurance in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. 
 
English guilds were not ignoring other aspects of mutuality. They feasted and 
processed, built halls to house their discussions and hold their records and 
possessions, and gathered the paraphernalia to foster collective identity. They did 
not ignore other aspects of the moments of stress that mutual insurance would 
later help resolve. In particular, a number of guilds came together to honour their 
members at their burials. The London Founders’ guild expected its members to 
attend the burials of liverymen. The London Butchers’ guild similarly favoured 
liverymen, ordering that when any liveryman died, the master, wardens and other 
liverymen were to attend the corpse.23 The London Brewers in the early 
seventeenth century list money received at the burial of the dead in their 
accounts.24 We could go on, but the point is clear: mutuality was not missing from 
English guilds, just mutual insurance. 
 
There is an unavoidable note of uncertainty about this conclusion, given the 
chance that we may be missing evidence mutual protection because of the 
constraints on the historical sources that remain available to us today. Most of the 
evidence that survives concerns the doings of the main guild; it is this that we 
have surveyed above. But organizations of journeymen and small masters – 
commonly known as the yeomanry - also existed. Indeed, Unwin famously 
suggested that tensions between the yeomanry and the guild were one of the major 
dynamics of this period.25 We know little of what services yeomanry organisations 
provided to their members, even when we are aware of their existence. These 
organizations tended to exist in larger guilds, such as the Clothworkers, Merchant 
Taylors, Drapers, and Bakers. However, their records no longer exist and we only 
                                                          
23 Guy Pearce, The History of the Butchers' Company (1929), 238. 
24 GL, MS 542/6 (1618) 
25 George Unwin, The Gilds and Companies of London (1908). 
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know of the organisation through references to their accounts being examined by 
the guild.26 Tantalisingly, the yeomanry of the Bakers was granted a set of rights 
by the guild in 1538 that included a chest, implying the right to hold stock and 
documents of their own.27 Yet if they did provide mutual welfare, this was not to 
appear among the many sources of controversy between the journeymen and the 
guild in the 1620s, which instead turned on bakers employing outside journeymen 
to cut wages. Similarly, the clothworkers’ yeomanry were protesting against their 
company’s failure to suppress workers from other trades entering clothfinishing, 
while the merchant taylors’ yeomanry complained against unfree tailors in the 
1670s.28 Problems with mutual insurance did not number among their grievances. 
Moreover, yeomanry organizations generally disappeared – or were abolished – 
during the seventeenth century, weakening any possible link between their 
activities and the emergence of later provision in the form of friendly societies. 
 
 
B. Guilds and charity 
The limited signs of any engagement with mutual insurance among early modern 
English craft guilds needs to be set against the very significant volumes of 
charitable activity that  was collectively provided by London’s guilds and, to a 
lesser extent, by their provincial brethren.  
 
The volume of guild charity grew over the sixteenth to eighteenth century. As Ian 
Archer has charted, the first half of the seventeenth century saw a peak in charity, 
followed by a collapse after the Great Fire century while destroyed property was 
restored.29 The eighteenth century saw charity growing again, following this 
period of retrenchment. Indeed, disasters aside, gifts tended to accumulate over 
time as they were usually given in the form of money, stock or property from which 
                                                          
26 The Clothworkers’ Company Archive, London [CCA], MS CL/B/1/10, 537 (1680). 
27 GL, MS 5117/1 (5 Dec 1538) 
28 GL, MS 5195; GL, MS 5117/4, 60v-61v (31 July 1623). Thomas Girtin, Golden Ram: A Narrative 
History of the Clothworkers Company (1958), 112-3; Davies and Saunders, Merchant Taylors,  220. 
29 Ian Archer, The Charity of Early Modern Londoners, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, 12 (2002), 223–244. See also: Steve Rappaport, Worlds within worlds: structures of life in 
sixteenth-century London (1989), 195–8. 
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the interest was to be expended, but not the capital.30 As guilds’ other expenses on 
regulation and litigation dwindled, a larger share remained available for 
distribution, with much funding devoted to maintaining almshouses to lodge 
dependent poor, paying regular pensions to nominated paupers, and more limited 
sums distributed in ad hoc general doles or disbursements. The forms of guild 
charity, in short, parallel those taken by public and private provision in England 
and elsewhere in Europe. 
 
If we compare the activities of the London Clothworkers' Company, one of the city’s 
larger and wealthiest guilds, over three centuries we can discern the outlines of 
this shift. In 1581-2, the Company recorded only three charitable distributions. 
The first occurred on the 29 August when gowns, shirts, smocks, and shoes were 
given to 12 poor men and 12 poor women (of whom 6 were described as widows) 
under the terms of William Lamb’s bequest, a legacy agreed 13 years earlier that 
also funded four sermons a year at the church of St James in the Wall. Lamb did 
not specify whether the recipients of clothing were to be members of the guild, just 
they were to be ‘impotent and lame’ – and to attend the four sermons.31  Many of 
the recipients bore common names, but five of the twelve had names that do not 
appear in the list of freemen entering the guild since 1545, suggesting that charity 
and membership were not tightly linked in this case.32 The second was a similarly 
indiscriminate gift of £4 to the poor of the parish of St Sepulchre on the 13 
December.33 Finally, the third was the gift of an annual pension of £6 13s 4d made 
‘To Philip Bolde for his greate povertie and necessitie’, which was made at the 
insistence of Sir Rowland Haywarde, who was a leading city merchant, former 
Lord Mayor and Alderman of the city, Member of Parliament, and one of the 
                                                          
30 The cumulative impact of charity in England is discussed in: Wilbur Jordan, Philanthropy in 
England 1480–1660. A Study of the Changing Pattern of English Social Aspirations (1959); John 
Hadwin, Deflating philanthropy, Economic History Review, 31 (1978) , 105– 17.  
31 CCA, MS CL/B/1/3 (1581-1605), f. 2; City of London Livery Companies Commission, City of 
London Livery Companies Commission. Report, Vol.4 (1884), 572-99. 
32 City of London Livery Companies Commission. Report, Vol.4 (1884), 572-99. 
33 CCA, MS CL/B/1/3, 2v 
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guild’s most powerful members.34 Why Bold deserved such a pension is unclear, 
but he does not appear to have been one of the guild’s freemen. 
 
The growth of the scale and inward-orientation of guild charity can be seen if we 
contrast this with the guild’s activities a century later. By 1680-1, Lamb’s charity 
had been joined with other clothing funds from Midlemore and Lute.35 In addition, 
John Heath had left a legacy of £1,000 in 1635 that funded a sermon and clothing, 
shoes and stockings for 30 poor men and women. Heath, unlike Lamb, favoured 
his fellow freemen: 26 of the 30 were to be freemen or freemen’s widows, and the 
other four were to be from the parish in which he was buried.36 In addition, the 
company managed almshouses in Whitefriers and Islington, which they used to 
support poor members, such as Symon White a poor artisan clothworker, who was 
given a place in the Islington Almshouse on the 4 May 1680 ‘for his good 
behaviour’.37 John Frewen, the son of another freeman, Ambrose Frewen, was 
given 20s on the 30 November 1680 ‘being very sick and weeke [sic] and poore’, 
although the guild noted that this should not be a precedent.38  
 
In 1680, the experience of Jane, the widow of Edward Hane, who was given £5 
having been left ‘in a very poor and miserable condition’ points to an interesting 
aspect of the development in guild charity. Her large payment (equivalent to two 
months’ wages for a building labourer) reflected a shift in company thinking on 
members’ contributions, for the payment was justified by a note recording that her 
‘Husband in his life time had not received back his livery money’. Livery money 
was the fee that freemen paid on promotion into the ‘livery’ of the guild, a tier of 
well-to-do members with additional rights and status, including the gowns that 
gave them their name and the privilege of voting for London’s Members of 
                                                          
34 P.W. Hasler (ed.),  The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1558-1603 (1981), sv. 
Rowland Hayward. 
35 CCA, MS CL/B/1/10, 557; City of London Livery Companies Commission. Report, 
Vol.4 (1884), 572-99. 
36 CCA, MS CL/B/1/10, 588; City of London Livery Companies Commission. Report, 
Vol.4 (1884), 572-99. 
37 CCA CL/B/1/10,  541. On almshouses, see: Nigel Goose, Accommodating the elderly poor: 
almshouses and the mixed economy of welfare in England in the second millennium, Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, 62 (2014), 33-57. 
38 CCA, CL/B/1/10,  556. Frewen senior had been freed in 1647.  
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Parliament. In 1697, the government of London was to limit promotion to the 
livery in the largest guilds to those individuals who were worth at least £1,000. To 
fall from this level of wealth to poverty implies that Jane Hane was the victim of 
a catastrophic transformation in her fortunes. And in such circumstances, the 
guild had now started to treat livery fines as a deposit that could be recovered by 
members who fell on hard times. The Clothworkers are not alone in this. The 
Merchant Taylors, at least, did the same, despite making an order against this in 
1680, when they cut the livery fine from £30 to £20, which specified that livery 
fees needed to be paid ‘without expectation of any of the said Twenty pounds is to 
be returned to any person whatsoever in case of misfortune or miscarriage in the 
world’.39 There is perhaps an element of insurance here, albeit a modest one. 
 
If we move forward another century, the trend towards focusing charity on guild 
members had continued. The sums spent on the distressed poor of the guild by the 
later eighteenth century had grown to more than £160 a year. Of the forty named 
recipients of aid, 23 were the widows of freemen, 3 were freemen, 1 was a 
liveryman. The remaining thirteen (mostly women) were probably not linked, but 
were nominated for pensions by someone within the guild.  
 
We can see much the same trajectory in the London Pewterers’ company. In 1581, 
they relieved one sick man in August and distributed charity in December. A 
century later in 1681, the year began with the Court giving 10s to William Mabbot 
‘being sick’. In March they distributed 20s among the poor. In June the court 
received petitions from Thomas Williams, widow Johnson, Thomas Cooper and 
Peter Brothersby for relief. In response, the Warden was ordered to give 10s to 
widow Johnson from Col Jacksons gift, and 5s to Brothersby and Cooper. That 
month, a further 2s 6d went to Thomas Curtis senior and the widows Vernon and 
Kendall, while 5s went to Robert Weely. The poor box was distributed in 
September, at which time it contained £3 7s 8d. Finally, that December another 
£2 5s 0d was given to the poor. Moving forward another century, in 1780 poor 
distribution had become even more organised, with payments from legacies 
                                                          
39 GL, MS 34010/10, 74, 82. 
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allocated to various recipients. Indeed, in that year the resources available to the 
guild grew substantially, with another £600 left by John Jones to provide for 9 
poor men and 9 poor women of the company, £100 left by Mr Norfolk to be invested 
to support 8 poor of the company, and an annuity of £30 given by Thomas Swanson 
for the company’s poor. Aside from these long-term charitable funds, the poor box 
remained an active system, with almost 50 poor men and women receiving 2s 6d 
each in September. 
 
Not all charity was confined to the guild’s members. Guild almshouses accepted 
other paupers. Funding was given to distressed Huguenots who were now in 
England in the 1680s, while in the 1780s £400 was sent to relieve those suffering 
in Jamaica, St Vincent, Barbados and Dominica.40  Guilds managed substantial 
charitable bequests that benefited outsiders, including many schools across the 
country and other funds. Guilds were intertwined with charity in other ways. Half 
of the fines collected by the Newcastle Coopers’ for non-members using their trade 
in the town were to be paid to the charity house for the relief of poor children – 
and poor cobblers were exempted from their supervision.41  
 
In summary, guild charity in London was large and growing over the sixteenth to 
eighteenth century, providing a significant source of support to guild members 
that was rooted in inter-generational mutuality. Legacies from past members 
provided an increasingly generous cushion for those within the guild who fell into 
poverty. Charity that had once been broadly focused on the needy of the city was 
now more focused on those with a direct tie to the guild. Philanthropy thus 
potentially stood in for more formalized forms of mutuality in this specific, urban 
and middling context.  
 
 
 
                                                          
40 GL, MS 34010/10, 558-59, 573. The company also distributed small funds from a poor box, but 
we cannot tell if the recipients were connected to the guild or not. The Grocers made a similar 
contribution to Jamaica and Barbados: GL, MS 11588/8,  48. 
41 Newcastle and Tyne Archives, GU. CO/2/2.  
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C. Guilds and Friendly Societies 
How can we explain the history of English friendly societies – exemplars of mutual 
protection – in light of the inactivity of the guilds? This is a pressing issue because 
friendly societies offer a type of mutual insurance that has often been identified 
as a successor to earlier guilds. They are the obvious candidate by which guilds 
and insurance can be linked. Friendly societies collected regular payments from 
members and offered a set of predictable benefits, such as payments during 
sickness, old-age or disability, and relief for widows and children in return.42  
 
The early history of friendly societies is not well understood, in part because of the 
loss of records, in part because adopting a patina of antiquity was itself an 
appealing strategy to societies seeking to convince members of their durability.43 
However, the broad pattern appears to be as follows. A few societies emerged in 
the seventeenth century, and in the later eighteenth century they grew 
enormously in number and membership. A very large number were founded at the 
time a bill was passed to encourage and regulate friendly societies in 1793, with 
the aim of reducing demand for poor relief by giving greater security to the 
societies’ funds.44 In towns and industry, friendly societies might be organised 
around occupational identities, as guilds had been, such as the Benevolent Society 
of Coachmakers (est 1816), although many were structured on other models.45 By 
1801, Eden estimated that membership was in the order of 648,000, while the Poor 
Law Return of 1803 contained reports of a total of 704,000 members in 9,672 
societies.46 Nearly a century later, in 1870, membership was thought to have 
exceeded four million people, with more than eleven million pounds in funds.47 At 
this level, more than half of adult males in Britain belonged to a society.  
                                                          
42 Susannah Ottaway, The Decline of Life: Old Age in Eighteenth-Century England(2008), 58, 78-
9. 
43 Peter Gosden, Self-help: voluntary associations in 19th century Britain (1974), 3. 
44 Ottaway, The Decline of Life: Old Age in Eighteenth-Century England(2008), 77. 
45 I. J. Prothero, Artisans and Politics in Early Nineteenth-century London (1979), 36. 
46 Peter Gosden, The Friendly Societies in England, 1815-1875 (1961), 5. See also: Martin Gorsky, 
The growth and distribution of friendly societies in the early nineteenth century, Economic History 
Review, 51 (1998), 489–511. 
47 Gosden, Friendly Societies, 14; this contemporary estimate attempts to account for societies that 
did not report to the registrar. Reporting societies contained around 1.4 million members. 
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Explanations for the growth of friendly societies over the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries vary. The expansion of industrial employment, the needs of 
the increasing number of industrial workers, a shift from paternalism to 
individual responsibility, the formalization of trade societies, have all been cited.48 
Ottaway suggests there was a growing cultural recognition in the eighteenth 
century of an ‘age-based need for formal assistance’ outside the poor law alongside 
a culture of self-help.49 There is little chance of disentangling these different 
explanations. We can, however, note that most appear to be pointing to 
developments that occurred after, or towards then end of, the period in which 
guilds were most visible in English society and economy. Were Friendly Societies 
perhaps the offspring or a substitute for England’s dwindling guilds? 
 
That the pattern of Friendly Societies was derived from earlier guilds has been 
widely asserted. No less than the secretary to the Royal Commission on Friendly 
Societies, J M Ludlow, wrote in 1873 that: ‘I feel convinced that there is no 
historical gap between the gild of old times and the modern friendly society; that 
if we knew all, we could trace the actual passage from one to the other’.50 Ludlow’s 
argument was derived from the strong view he possessed of medieval guilds: these 
were, it is important to note, pre-reformation guilds and confraternities that he 
had in mind. It was these which he considered to have essentially the same spirit 
and motive force as the friendly societies, to the extent that he claimed that the 
aims of the 1793 Act for regulating friendly societies were ‘all included in those 
commonly aimed at by the old gilds’.51 More recently, historians have continued to 
suggest variations on the same idea. Corden, for example, suggests that societies 
emerged in order to ‘replace’ reliance upon guilds and customary assistance.52 
Echoing Ludlow, he assumes that friendly societies were taking on some of the 
                                                          
48 Gosden, Friendly Societies, 2; Simon Cordery, British friendly societies, 1750-1914 (2003),  1;  
David Neave, Friendly Societies in Great Britain, in: Marcel van der Linden (ed.), Social Security 
Mutualism (1996), 41-64 (47-8); Prothero, Artisans, 35-6. 
49 Ottaway, Decline of Life, 13,75. 
50 J. M. Ludlow, Gilds and Friendly Societies, The Contemporary Review, 21 (1873), 737. See also: 
Gosden, The Friendly Societies, 1-2; Dermot Morrah, A History of Industrial Life Assurance (1955), 
11-18; Daniel Weinbren, The Oddfellows, 1810-2010 (2010),  1. 
51 Ludlow, Gilds, 744. Similar views appear in other late nineteenth century studies. See: Cordery, 
British Friendly Societies,  17. 
52 Cordery, British Friendly Societies,  13. See also: Neave, Friendly Societies, 46. 
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services that guilds had once provided, and that they ‘copied guild models’.53 
Identifying shared aims (collective self-help), a shared culture (of collective 
assembly), and shared functions (supporting members unable to work through 
disaster or age, honouring the dead, assisting the needy), Weinbren makes the 
same claim: ‘medieval and early-modern religious and craft guilds can be seen as 
the parents of both friendly societies and charities’.54  
 
Certainly, nineteenth century friendly societies appear to have believed they were 
adopting guild characteristics in the mock-Tudor rituals and paraphernalia they 
adopted to strengthen mutuality via processions, feasts and ceremony. Whether 
seen as the offspring or substitutes, societies appear in this literature as the 
functional heirs of guilds. 
 
Evidence for any direct connection between friendly societies and guilds is 
negligible, however. The earliest known friendly societies date from the late 
seventeenth century. In England, the Friendly Benefit Society of Bethnal Green, 
based at the Norfolk Arms in Bethnal Green, claimed to have been established in 
1687 and survived in 1883 with 61 members and £1,236 in funds. The next oldest 
surviving society dated from 1703 (the Norman Friendly Society, also in London, 
on St Peter Street, Hackney Road).55  But only another 73 of the societies then 
extant pre-dated 1780, and none had any identifiable link to a craft or trade guild. 
In fact, the great majority of older societies (70%) had been founded a few decades 
not centuries before, with most established between 1761 and 1780. Several sea 
towns in Scotland had box clubs that did date from the early seventeenth century. 
These took the form of common funds to pay for sickness, widows, orphans and so 
on, and were funded by head taxes on sailings or the profits of voyages.56 Another 
early source of friendly societies lay in the Huguenot immigrants who arrived after 
                                                          
53 Cordery, British Friendly Societies,  14-20 (17); Weinbren, Odd Fellows, 38-39. 
54 Daniel Weinbren, Supporting self-help: charity, mutuality and reciprocity in nineteenth-century 
Britain, in: Jose Harris and Susan Brigden (eds.), Charity and Mutual Aid in Europe and north 
America since 1800 (2007), 67-88 (68). 
55 Annual Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, vol. LXVII (1883), 9. The oldest 
surviving Scottish friendly society in 1883 dated from 1679 in Lithlingow (p. 14). 
56 Gosden, Self Help, 6. 
22 
 
the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.57 Clearly, at least some early 
friendly societies were active in the same period in which craft guilds remained 
indisputably alive. Yet can we identify more than chronology to their relationship? 
 
In fact, contrary to Ludlow, Corden and other historians’ beliefs, early friendly 
societies were markedly different from craft guilds in several important ways. 
Where English guilds were primarily urban, friendly societies encompassed rural, 
small villages and towns. Where guilds were in essence associations of employers, 
friendly societies incorporated labourers and poor artisans; they funded tramping 
journeymen not resident masters.58 Where guilds were formed by those able to win 
for the support of town governors to support and enforce their powers over an 
economic sector, the early friendly societies emerged in marginal groups – 
migrants, sailors, suburban workers – whose access to formal systems of welfare 
may well have been compromised by a lack of settlement or religious differences. 
Even the geography of friendly societies was markedly different to the distribution 
of guilds, in being concentrated in the industrial north west. By the 1880s, the 
largest concentration of societies (17% of the total) was in Lancashire; the next 
largest density was in neighbouring Yorkshire.59 These were counties with 
relatively few incorporated towns, and thus, we can infer, few guilds.  
 
What then of the functional similarities between guilds and societies? This is a 
somewhat abstract test of the relationship, in that many of the mechanisms by 
which organizations reinforce cohesion are relatively generic and exist across a 
wide range of societies and periods. That guilds and societies behaved alike in 
some regards should be unsurprising to us. Even setting aside that caveat, the 
parallel here seems weak. As we saw earlier, the density of services provided to 
the poor and desperate by early modern guilds was relatively thin. Recipients of 
support were largely selected by the discretion of guild elites. Even the degree to 
                                                          
57 Gosden, Self Help, 6-7. The Norman Club was one consequence of this. 
58 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (1963), 241, 421; Gosden, Friendly 
Societies, 74-6; Cordery, Friendly Societies, 24; Weinbren, Odd Fellows,70; Gorsky, Friendly 
Societies, 493-99; Cf. on journeyman tramping, Weinbren, Supporting self-help, 70, where he 
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59 Annual Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, vol.  LXVII (1883), 17 
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which early modern guilds anticipated the broader conviviality of nineteenth 
century societies is questionable: in seventeenth-century London, feasting and 
processions tended to be the preserve of the governing elite of guilds, not the 
everyday freeman master. 
 
The root cause of this mistaken identification between guilds and friendly societies 
appears to be a vagueness about the distinction between philanthropy and 
insurance. This is evident, for example, in Leeson’s study of tramping which elides 
any difference between the medieval guilds provision for ‘the poor, the sick and 
the aged’ and the box clubs and friendly societies of the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Leeson suggests that their emergence was a response to 
masters retreating from supporting poor working members, ignoring the key 
difference between the two forms of organisation (let alone the lack of any evidence 
of a retreat from charity on the part of the guilds, which were, if anything, 
engaging in more rather than less charitable provision).60  
 
To be fair, some historians of friendly societies were clearly uncertain about what 
type of guild they were considering. Morrah, for example, saw the tie as a 
conceptual rather than an organizational one, because it was the pre-reformation 
guilds that he saw as the forerunners of friendly societies. In drawing this parallel, 
he was on safer ground.  
 
Medieval parish guilds, or confraternities as they are now often styled, were 
largely stripped of their assets and legitimacy with the Reformation. But until 
then, the number and geographical distribution of confraternities was closer to 
that of the later friendly societies.61 Moreover, some fraternities did offer support 
to their poor or sick members on terms that were comparable to the mutual 
                                                          
60 Robert Leeson, Travelling Brothers (1979), 25, 77-78. 
61 Gervase Rosser, The Art of Solidarity in the Middle Ages: Guilds in England 1250-1550 (2015), 
50, 82-84; Virginia Bainbridge, Gilds in the Medieval Countryside (1996); Ken Farnhill, Guilds 
and the Parish Community in Late Medieval East Anglia, C. 1470-1550 (2001); David Crouch, 
Piety, Fraternity, and Power: Religious Gilds in Late Medieval Yorkshire, 1389 -1547 (2000).  
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insurance activities of Dutch guilds.62 In this, they clearly differed from the 
provisions made by early-modern English craft guilds. The guild of Our Lady’s 
Nativity at Wymondham, Norfolk, offered a penny a day in relief to members who 
fell sick. The guild of St Anne’s in London offered an allowance, but restricted it 
to those with five years of membership, thus addressing adverse selection issues.63 
In Kingston upon Hull, all three of the fraternities for which rules survive had 
some form of mutual protection. In the guild of St John the Baptist, for example, 
any of the members who became 'infirm, bowed, blind, dumb, deaf, maimed or sick, 
whether… lasting or only temporary' were to be paid a sum of money each week, 
so long as they live - with their membership fees deducted if they cannot afford 
them. They were also given 5s at Martinmas to get a garment. The other two guilds 
specified the sum at 7d and 14d a week respectively, generous amounts for that 
period. Guilds in York, Lincoln and Chesterfield also made some form of provision 
to relieve members who fell into poverty. Certainly, even if the main purpose of 
confraternities was not mutual protection, a substantial number of those for which 
ordinances survive did envisage this as part of their work.64 
 
In sum, there is no evidence for any direct or indirect link between the craft guilds 
of the sixteenth to eighteenth century and friendly societies in England. An 
exception to this rule may appear in future research. However, the general pattern 
– and with it the sharp contrast to the functions of guilds in the Netherlands – 
seems unassailable. Where there is a link between friendly societies and guilds it 
is to medieval guilds, or confraternities (language being an issue here, clearly). 
This link takes the form of a functional parallel, not an institutional tie or some 
form of substitution or replacement, given the long break between the heydays of 
the two types of organization. English guilds before the Reformation did, at least 
at times, create some forms of mutual assistance, albeit that they do not appear to 
have developed many, if any, of the more advanced features that would appear 
                                                          
62 For an overview of the scale of this contribution, see: van Bavel and Rijpma, Formalized charity 
and social spending, 162-4. 
63 Rosser, Art of Solidarity, 83-4. 
64 See Derek Keene, English Urban Guilds, c.900-1300, in: Ian Gadd and Patrick Wallis, Guilds, 
Society and Economy in London 1450-1800 (2002), 3-26 (9-10). 
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later. Their early-modern successors in the crafts and trades did not. The two 
centuries between the Reformation and the upsurge of friendly societies formed a 
profound break in the link of corporative behaviour and mutual insurance in 
English history. 
 
 
D. Conclusion 
To conclude, English early modern craft guilds provided no mutual insurance for 
their members.  This is a stark contrast with Dutch guilds and indicates the need 
to qualify van der Linden’s hypothesis about the relationship between guilds and 
mutual insurance. Despite the beliefs of several generations of historians and 
commentators, friendly societies had no direct relationship to craft guilds. Any 
indirect relationship is also unclear: they were not substituting for guilds, given 
that guilds did not provide mutual insurance; nor were they building from 
communities formed within guilds, at least so far as we can see. Some exceptions 
to this may yet turn up. But the connection of friendly society and guild appears 
to be an imagined heritage, not an actual bloodline, one of many legitimating 
echoes of the middle ages that were sewn into Victorian social and political origin 
stories. 
 
Given that guilds in other parts of Europe did come to manage mutual insurance 
schemes, it seems reasonable to ask why this did not occur in England? Precursors 
of mutual insurance existed among pre-reformation confraternities. Yet this was 
stillborn, and left no traces in the occupationally-focused craft and trade guilds of 
the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. We can do no more than speculate, but 
several factors may well explain this. First, the Reformation itself stripped 
confraternities of their property and right to exist unless they were narrowly 
reconceived as occupational monopolies with a focus on craft regulation.65 This set 
the tone for England’s later craft guilds, and the purity of that tone was monitored 
                                                          
65 Note, however, that without a detailed history of mutual provision by confraternities, we cannot 
be sure about the vitality of the system at the time of the Reformation. In the Netherlands, the 
formalization of guild welfare predated and bridged the reformation: van Leeuwen, Guilds, 80-81. 
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and secured through their dependency on local or national permission to operate. 
Simply put, English guilds would have needed both the will to act and the ability 
to obtain a license from some branch of the government if they were to create a 
mutual insurance system. 
 
However, the Reformation and state supervision seem insufficient in themselves 
to explain the failure to reinvent mutual insurance over the subsequent centuries. 
England was influenced in many ways by immigrants who would have experienced 
mutual welfare systems in their home countries. In the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, Dutch, Flemish and French migrants joined or cooperated with English 
guilds, although often under some constraints. The idea of mutual insurance 
surely reached English cities. So why was there no fertilization? For this, the 
introduction of the English poor law, with the uniquely strong ties between parish 
and welfare that it created, surely mattered, in offering a means to survive the 
worst of shocks and a clear tax-based funding system.66 Guild freemen contributed 
– and possessed rights to – parish poor relief. Many must have been involved in 
its administration too. But poor relief need not drive out civil society. Mutual 
insurance was a more generous lower middle class alternative to poor relief in the 
Northern Netherlands.  And this points us to other possible reasons, at least in 
London, which as the largest urban centre might have been the natural point for 
the creation of mutual insurance: the scale of charitable relief offered by guilds 
may well have attenuated the need for a mutual system. Indeed, charity seems a 
convincing reason for the lack of action in the eighteenth century, when most of 
London’s guilds withdrew (or were driven from) economic regulation and instead 
served principally as the governing bodies for large charitable endowments, at 
least part of which was specifically dedicated to preserving the wellbeing of their 
memberships. 
  
                                                          
66 After the Great Fire of 1666, parishes in London were also required to provide fire engines and 
equipment: Pearson, Insuring, 83. 
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Appendix A: London Guild Ordinances 
Guild Date Source 
Bakers 1507, 
1746 
GL, MS 5197A 
Bakers 1582 GL, MS 5197 
Brewers 1406 Mia Ball, The worshipful company of 
brewers: a short history (1977), 59-61 
Brewers 1579 GL, MS 5496 
Brewers 1639 GL, MS 5497 
Brewers 1739 GL, MS 5501 
Butchers 1607 Guy Pearce, History of the Butchers (1929), 
201-39 
Butchers 1685 GL, MS 6460 
Carpenters 1486-7 Edward Jupp, An Historical Account of the 
Worshipful Company of Carpenters of the 
City of London, 2nd edn. (1887), 346-50 
Carpenters 1607 Bower Marsh (ed.), Records of the Worshipful 
Company of Carpenters, vol. 1 (1913), 5-13. 
Clothworkers 1532 Thomas Girtin, Golden Ram: A Narrative 
History of the Clothworkers Company 
(1958), Appendix A. 
Clothworkers 1587 The ordinances of the Clothworkers 
company, together with those of the ancient 
guilds of Fullers and Shearmen (1881), 37-
96. 
Clothworkers 1693 The ordinances of the Clothworkers 
company, together with those of the ancient 
guilds of Fullers and Shearmen (1881), 97-
114. 
Coopers 1507 GL, MS 5633B. 
Coopers 1741 George Elkington, The Worshipful company 
of Coopers. With notes and recollections, 
1873-1930 ( 1930). 
Curriers 1605 Edward Mayer and Donald Adamson, The 
Curriers Company: a modern history (2000), 
182; GL, MS 6117. 
Drapers 1418 Arthur Johnson, The History of the 
Worshipful Company of the Drapers of 
London, vol. 1 (1914), Appendix 9. 
Drapers 1455-6 Johnson, Drapers, vol. 1, appendix 10. 
Drapers 1541-60 Johnson, Drapers, vol. 2, 284-92. 
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